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95 
THE CASE FOR SEMI-STRONG-FORM 
CORPORATE SCIENTER IN 
SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS 
Paul B. Maslo*†  
INTRODUCTION 
To establish liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant acted with scienter, “a mental state embracing in-
tent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”
1
 A plaintiff is required to allege at 
the pleading stage facts creating a “strong inference” of scienter, which must 
then be proven by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
2
 This endeavor is rel-
atively straightforward when the defendant is an individual. The analysis 
becomes more complicated when a corporate defendant is involved, howev-
er, because a corporation, though a “person” under the law, can only act 
through its agents. A corporation has no “single mind of its own,”
3
 so “its 
scienter is necessarily derived from its employees.”
4
 Reflecting this com-
plexity, courts have evolved three different approaches to address corporate 
scienter in the securities fraud context: strong-form corporate scienter, 
weak-form corporate scienter, and semi-strong-form corporate scienter. 
The most rigorous of the three standards is strong-form corporate scien-
ter, which requires plaintiffs to show that the same agent who made a 
misrepresentation on a company‟s behalf also possessed the requisite scien-
ter. At the other end of the spectrum lies weak-form corporate scienter. The 
weak-form approach does not require the agent who made a misstatement 
on the company‟s behalf to have acted with scienter. Moreover, no individu-
                                                                                                                      
 * Paul Maslo is an Associate in the Securities Litigation/Directors‟ & Officers‟ Liability 
and Financial Products Litigation practice groups in the New York office of King & Spalding. Mr. 
Maslo earned his A.B. at Cornell University, M.S. at Johns Hopkins University, and J.D. at the 
University of Pennsylvania, where he also studied finance at the Wharton School of Business. 
†       Paul B. Maslo, Commentary, The Case for Semi-Strong-Form Corporate Scienter in Se-
curities Fraud Actions, 108 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 95 (2010), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/maslo.pdf. 
 1. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 25 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). 
 2. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328-329 (2007) (“We em-
phasize, as well, that under our construction of the „strong inference‟ standard, a plaintiff is not 
forced to plead more than she would be required to prove at trial. A plaintiff alleging fraud in a § 
10(b) action, we hold today, must plead facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as likely as 
any plausible opposing inference. At trial, she must then prove her case by a „preponderance of the 
evidence.‟ Stated otherwise, she must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the defendant 
acted with scienter.”) (emphasis in original; internal citation omitted).  
 3. In re Monster Worldwide, Inc. Sec. Lit., 549 F.Supp.2d 578, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing 
Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 4. In re Monster, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (internal quotation omitted). 
MASLO FI ITP_C UPDATE.DOC 7/17/2010 3:30 PM 
96 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 108:95 
 
al agent is required to possess scienter. Instead, courts may aggregate the 
knowledge of multiple corporate agents, none of whom possesses scienter 
individually, to establish collective corporate scienter. There is no require-
ment that any of these agents be connected to the misstatement. Semi-
strong-form corporate scienter occupies the middle ground. The semi-
strong-form standard requires proof that one agent committed a reprehensi-
ble act with scienter in connection with a misrepresentation, but does not 
demand that the agent possessing scienter be the maker of the misstatement. 
This Essay argues that semi-strong-form corporate scienter provides the 
best approach, because it strikes a balance between several countervailing 
public policy concerns. 
I. STRONG-FORM CORPORATE SCIENTER 
The Northern District of California best articulated the theory of strong-
form corporate scienter in Apple Computer.
5
 The plaintiffs brought claims 
against Apple and its CEO Steve Jobs, alleging that Jobs made material mi-
srepresentations regarding sales projections for a new product. Apple was 
unable to meet the projections because of production problems. The plain-
tiffs presented evidence establishing that other Apple agents were aware of 
the problems. They did not, however, present sufficient evidence that Jobs 
himself, the maker of the misstatements, had knowledge of the production 
problems when he made the misrepresentations. Accordingly, the court held 
that the plaintiffs‟ allegations were insufficient to create an inference that 
Jobs acted with scienter. In refusing to aggregate Jobs‟ misstatements with 
the knowledge of other Apple agents, the court further determined that Ap-
ple could not have acted with scienter:  
It is not enough to establish fraud on the part of a corporation that one cor-
porate officer makes a false statement that another officer knows to be 
false. A defendant corporation is deemed to have the requisite scienter for 
fraud only if the individual corporate officer making the statement has the 
requisite level of scienter, i.e., knows that the statement is false, or is at 
least deliberately reckless as to its falsity, at the time that he or she makes 
the statement. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Northern District‟s dismissal of claims 
against Jobs and Apple, holding in regard to Apple: “A corporation is 
deemed to have the requisite scienter for fraud only if the individual corpo-
rate officer making the statement has the requisite level of scienter at the 
time that he or she makes the statement.”
6
 
Courts have also employed strong-form corporate scienter at the sum-
mary judgment stage to extinguish claims against corporate defendants. In 
Tyson Foods, the plaintiffs asserted claims based on alleged misrepresenta-
tions in a press release regarding Tyson‟s termination of its plans to merge 
                                                                                                                      
 5. In re Apple Computer, Inc., Sec. Litig., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 6. In re Apple Computer, Inc., 127 Fed. Appx. 296, 303 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation 
omitted). 
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with another entity.
7
 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the individual defendants and Tyson, stating: 
For a corporation to have primary liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 
scienter must be present with respect to at least one of the officers or 
agents who made a false or misleading statement. Having concluded that 
each of the individual defendants is entitled to summary judgment under § 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as a matter of law, Tyson Foods can not be primarily 
liable and is entitled to summary judgment. 
The Third Circuit affirmed this decision: “Having concluded that there 
is no primary liability on the part of any of the individual officers, the Dis-
trict Court properly held that Tyson Foods could not itself be primarily 
liable under the facts of this case.”
8
 
At first glance, public policy appears to support the theory of strong-
form scienter, because its use curbs abusive litigation. Congress enacted the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act to check perceived abuses of pri-
vate § 10(b) securities litigation, including “nuisance filings, targeting of 
deep-pocket defendants, vexatious discovery requests and manipulation by 
class action lawyers.”
9
 Limiting private securities fraud actions to only 
those instances where plaintiffs can show that an agent who made a misre-
presentation on behalf of a company possessed scienter would help to 
ensure that only the strongest claims are brought. 
Unfortunately, while furthering the goal of preventing strike suits, the 
strong-form theory also allows malfeasant corporations to skirt securities 
laws by simply compartmentalizing information, i.e., by separating the 
“mouth” of the operation from the “brain.” Under this approach, a company 
wishing to commit fraud could escape liability by shielding agents who 
speak on its behalf from knowledge of facts contradicting their public 
statements. Such tactics could result in a company clearly and intentionally 
misleading its investors, yet allowing the investors no legal recourse be-
cause they are unable to tie evidence of scienter to a specific agent who 
made a misstatement on its behalf.  
II. WEAK-FORM CORPORATE SCIENTER 
In Bridgestone, the Sixth Circuit endorsed the use of weak-form corpo-
rate scienter at the pleading stage.
10
 The plaintiffs brought claims under § 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against Bridgestone, its subsidiary Firestone, Bridges-
tone‟s former CEO Yoichiro Kaizaki, and Masatoshi Ono, Bridgestone‟s 
former Executive VP and Firestone‟s former CEO. Although the court 
upheld the dismissal of claims against the individual defendants Kaizaki and 
Ono, it allowed claims to proceed against the corporate defendants: “[W]e 
conclude under the totality of the circumstances that the facts argued collec-
tively give rise to a strong inference of at least recklessness.” Thus, the 
                                                                                                                      
 7. In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., Civ. A. No. 01-425-SLR, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11122 (D. Del. June 17, 2004). 
 8. In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 155 Fed. Appx. 53, 57 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 9. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 320. 
 10. City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005).  
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Bridgestone court held that scienter can be pled against a corporate defen-
dant by looking to its collective knowledge, regardless of whether scienter is 
alleged against an individual agent. 
Likewise, the Southern District of New York relied on weak-form scien-
ter to deny a corporate defendant‟s motion for summary judgment in 
WorldCom.
11
 The defendant accounting firm Arthur Andersen argued that it 
was entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiffs “failed to demon-
strate that a particular Andersen auditor acted with scienter.” The court 
disagreed: “To carry their burden of showing that a corporate defendant 
acted with scienter, plaintiffs in securities fraud cases need not prove that 
any one individual employee of a corporate defendant also acted with scien-
ter. Proof of a corporation‟s collective knowledge and intent is sufficient.” 
As such, the court held that the plaintiffs were “entitled to show reckless 
misconduct through a cumulative pattern of decisions and inaction by sever-
al Andersen auditors,” i.e., that “Andersen as a firm was reckless.” The 
court, relying on the First Circuit‟s analysis in Bank of New England, rea-
soned that modern corporate structure necessitated the use of this approach. 
As the First Circuit aptly stated: 
Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of 
specific duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of 
those components constitutes the corporation‟s knowledge of a particular 
operation. It is irrelevant whether employees administering one component 
of an operation know the specific activities of employees administering 
another aspect of the operation: A corporation cannot plead innocence by 
asserting that the information obtained by several employees was not ac-
quired by any one individual who then would have comprehended its full 
import. Rather the corporation is considered to have acquired the collec-
tive knowledge of its employees and is held responsible for their failure to 
act accordingly.
12
 
Allowing claims founded on weak-form corporate scienter does prevent 
delinquent companies from avoiding liability by compartmentalizing know-
ledge. Yet any positive influence the use of weak-form scienter might have 
on corporate policy is drastically overshadowed by its inconsistency with 
the federal securities laws, the inefficient incentives it creates, and its nega-
tive impact on the dissemination of information. 
The weak-form approach, which pegs liability to a corporate entity‟s 
failure to parse together the knowledge of its agents, is akin to a negligence 
standard.
13
  Moreover, this theory is clearly at odds with Congress‟ intention 
to discourage unmeritorious litigation under the PSLRA. Weak-form scien-
ter makes it exceedingly easy for overzealous plaintiffs to advance past the 
motion to dismiss stage, at which point they can use the leverage of discov-
ery to extort settlements from corporate defendants. 
Reliance on weak-form scienter would also cause the inefficient alloca-
tion of corporate resources and stymie communications. Under this 
                                                                                                                      
 11. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 12. United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 13. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 (holding that a cause of action under § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 does not lie for mere negligence). 
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approach, a risk-averse corporation would have to spend undue amounts of 
human and monetary capital to determine that each piece of information 
communicated to investors had been thoroughly vetted to ensure that none 
of the corporation‟s agents possesses any information which, in combination 
with information possessed by other agents, could be construed as being 
inconsistent with the company‟s public statements. These costs would be 
substantial. It is doubtful that even the most earnest companies could comp-
ly with this unduly burdensome requirement, which would dampen 
communications between companies and their investors, a primary objective 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
14
 
III. SEMI-STRONG-FORM CORPORATE SCIENTER  
The Fifth Circuit discussed the standard of proof required under semi-
strong-form corporate scienter in Southland: 
For purposes of determining whether a statement made by the corporation 
was made by it with the requisite Rule 10(b) scienter we believe it appro-
priate to look to the state of mind of the individual corporate official or 
officials who make or issue the statement (or order or approve it or its 
making or issuance, or who furnish information or language for inclusion 
therein, or the like) rather than generally to the collective knowledge of all 
the corporation‟s officers and employees acquired in the course of their 
employment.
15
 
Since the plaintiffs did not allege that any particular employee other 
than the named executive defendants acted with scienter in connection with 
any of the misstatements, the Southland court held that the plaintiffs were 
limited to this pool of named individual defendants in pleading that the cor-
porate defendant acted with scienter. In other words, in order to prove that a 
corporate defendant acted with scienter, a plaintiff must provide evidence 
showing that an individual agent who is connected to—but not necessarily 
the maker of—the misstatement at issue had scienter.  
Judge Richard Posner applied the semi-strong-form standard in Tellabs 
to reverse the lower court‟s grant of a motion to dismiss: “That no member 
of the company‟s senior management who was involved in authorizing or 
making public statements . . . knew that they were false is very hard to cre-
dit, and no plausible story has yet been told by the defendants that might 
dispel our incredulity.”
16
 
Similarly, the District of Columbia utilized semi-strong-form scienter in 
Johnson, an action brought by the SEC.
17
 The defendant, Christopher 
Benyo, a former Senior Vice President for Marketing and Network Devel-
opment at PurchasePro.com, was found liable for aiding and abetting 
PurchasePro‟s violations of the securities laws. Benyo argued in his motion 
for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative for a new trial that the 
                                                                                                                      
 14. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986).  
 15. Southland Sec. Corp v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(emphasis added). 
 16. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 708-709 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 17. SEC v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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SEC had not presented sufficient evidence to establish a primary violation 
by PurchasePro, because the SEC did not show that PurchasePro‟s president 
(the party who acted on its behalf) possessed scienter. The court disagreed 
and denied Benyo‟s motions: 
[M]ultiple PurchasePro officers, including Layne and Boeth, could have 
provided the requisite scienter. Both Layne and Boeth furnished informa-
tion or language for inclusion in the earnings statement, and each admitted 
that they knew claiming the AuctioNet revenue in the First Quarter of 2001 
was fraudulent at the time in question. Given the evidence presented re-
garding Boeth and Layne‟s role in the earnings announcement and their 
scienter, the jury had sufficient probative evidence to find that PurchasePro 
had engaged in a Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 violation. 
Demanding that plaintiffs show scienter by an individual management-
level employee, who is concretely connected to but not necessarily the mak-
er of a misrepresentation, prevents corporate bad actors from avoiding 
liability by compartmentalizing information. But it does so without heaping 
unrealistic expectations on corporations making a good faith effort to comp-
ly with the law. Rather than requiring a company to undertake the nearly 
impossible task of synthesizing the knowledge of its agents prior to making 
a public statement, semi-strong-form scienter simply requires those execu-
tives responsible for the statement to ensure the statement does not contain 
information which contradicts what they know to be true. This is a reasona-
ble expectation. 
Furthermore, semi-strong-form scienter discourages trivial litigation 
without forcing wronged shareholders to comply with overly stringent re-
quirements on the types of claims they may bring. This theory requires 
plaintiffs to show that a specific individual employee possessed scienter—
which ensures that plaintiffs cannot bring a claim lacking a fully-developed 
theory of liability—but does not limit plaintiffs to only those individuals 
responsible for making the alleged misstatements. 
CONCLUSION 
How to attribute the mental state of scienter to a corporate entity has far-
reaching implications. Strong-form scienter—limiting the imputation of 
scienter to only those instances in which the maker of a misstatement pos-
sessed intent—would stifle legitimate claims that do not satisfy this narrow 
criterion. It also would prompt companies seeking to evade the securities 
laws to erect barriers between those who speak on their behalf from those 
possessing knowledge. Weak-form scienter—taking an aggregative ap-
proach to corporate scienter—would result in unmeritorious claims, 
economic inefficiency, and degraded corporate communications. The semi-
strong-form standard, on the other hand, provides the right blend of incen-
tives. The approach encourages companies to be thorough in their 
compliance with securities laws without making unreasonable demands. It 
also sets the bar just high enough to weed out shoddy claims while allowing 
valid claims to pass. Perhaps the strongest evidence that semi-strong-form 
scienter is the right choice is that it is the approach which most closely 
aligns the interests of corporations and their shareholders by encouraging 
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the most efficient allocation of corporate resources while adequately pro-
tecting shareholder rights. 
